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III. INTRODUCTION 
Since this appeal was filed, Chris and Valerie Mesenbrink filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
protection. An order discharging and closing the case was entered on May 22, 2013, by the 
bankruptcy court. Thus, the issue of personal liability for the judgment entered herein with 
respect to Chris and Valerie Mesenbrink is moot, and a motion to withdraw the appeal with 
respect to these individuals was submitted to the Court at the same time as the filing of this reply 
brief. Appellant's arguments advanced in this appellate proceeding moving forward are tendered 
only on behalf of Mesenbrink Lumber, L.L.C. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, Appellant 
will be referred to in this brief as "Mesenbrink" for consistency with the opening appeal brief in 
this matter. 
In their response, Lighty partially acknowledges they failed to timely file for attorney 
fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54. Lighty contends that Mesenbrink's knowledge that Lighty's 
preserved a right to seek costs and attorney fees in the stipulation to dismiss excuses their failure 
to comply with the time limits established in I.R.C.P. 54. Lighty further claims that errors made 
by the trial court when it issued an order of dismissal created circumstances that excused a timely 
filing by them of a request for costs and fees as required by I.R.C.P. 54. 
Lighty' s open their brief with the statement: "This is a simple case of a district court's 
sound exercise of its discretion and enforcement of a binding stipulation among the parties." 
Mesenbrink disagrees with Lighty's characterization on appeal. The issue on appeal advanced 
by Mesenbrink is more accurately described as the correct interplay of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, specifically as applied to a timely application for attorney fees, following a stipulated 
dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(a)(2). 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Judgment entered by stipulation of the parties pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41 (a)(l) 
is a final judgment 
Both parties cite Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 as authority for their 
positions. The facts in Straub are remarkably comparable to the facts in this instant case, and are 
worth closer consideration. Like here, Straub involved the sale of commercial property. Just 
prior to trial, Plaintiff Straub filed a motion with the trial court to dismiss their case with 
prejudice. Separately, but on the same day, Defendant Smith filed a document with the court 
stipulating to the court's entry of an order granting Straub's motion to dismiss. The respective 
pleadings were each signed by the attorney representing the party. Straub also submitted to the 
trial court a proposed order of dismissal, without prior review by Smith's attorney, which 
dismissed the case with prejudice and stated there would be no award of fees or costs. The trial 
court subsequently signed the order, which purported to dismiss the case with prejudice without 
an award of costs or fees. 
Smith timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's dismissal order, together 
with a memorandum of costs. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. Straub appealed 
the denial. 
Straub asserted on appeal that the dismissal of their case was pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
41 (a)(l) based on the stipulation making an issuance of a court order unnecessary, even though 
Straub had submitted an order for the trial judge's signature. Fallowing a thorough analysis of 
the rules of civil procedure, this Court concluded that the case was dismissed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
41(a)(l) by stipulation of the parties even though there were two pleadings filed, one by each 
party. This Court noted that such a dismissal is the functional equivalent of a judgment, stating 
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that "[t]he dismissal was a final judgment and the Smiths' motion for reconsideration should 
have cited I.R.C.P. 59 (e), Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment." Straub, 145 Idaho at 71. 
In his special concurrence, Chief Justice Eismann stated: 
... A dismissal of an action 'with prejudice' is simply an adjudication on 
the merits of the plaintiffs claim. (Citations omitted.) In the instant case, there 
was no final judgment until the action was dismissed with prejudice. The 
dismissal of Straub's action with prejudice was a precondition to the Smiths' right 
to recover court costs and attorney fees, not a denial of that right. ... The Smiths 
had the right to seek an award of attorney fees by filing a memorandum of 
costs within fourteen days after entry of the judgment. I.R.C.P. 54( d)(5) & 
( e )(5) . ... (Emphasis added.) 
Straub at 73. 
This Court then looked at whether in the stipulation filed with the Court Smith waived 
their right to assert a claim for costs and attorney fees as ad advanced by Smith. This Court 
utilized principles of contract law in its interpretation of the stipulation. This Court noted Straub 
drafted the contract, and it was silent on the issue of attorney fees. This Court concluded that 
there was nothing in the stipulation that indicated Smith intended to waive their right to seek an 
award of costs and attorney fees. 
B. There was no contract to allow Lighty to file their memorandum of costs 
outside the time limits dictated in Rules 54( d)(5) and 54( e )(5) 
Mesenbrink filed a motion with the district court on May 12, 2010, requesting voluntary 
dismissal of the Plaintiffs' action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(a)(2). R Vol. I, pp. 196-197. Five days 
later, on May 17, 2010, the Lighty's attorney filed a stipulation signed by both parties' attorneys 
stipulating to" ... an order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41 (a)(l) dismissing with prejudice all claims 
asserted by Mesenbrink against Lighty in this matter. The Parties further stipulated to submit the 
issues of costs and attorney fees to the trial court for determination, including a determination of 
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the Parties' rights to costs and fees to the [sic] pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) 
et seq. and the 2001 Asset Purchase Agreement." R Vol. I, pp. 203-204. 
There was no agreement that Lighty would have longer than fourteen days after the filing 
of the stipulation to file their request for costs and attorney fees. In fact, the stipulation 
specifically indicated that the parties would comply with I.R.C.P. 54(d) in filing any request for 
costs and fees. Thus, to be a timely application for costs and fees, Lighty' s Memorandum of 
Cost was required to be filed May 31, 2013. 
In conclusion, according to the holding in Straub, the final judgment occurred May 17, 
2010. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d) et seq., the time period for filing a motion for attorney fees 
commenced on the date of filing the stipulation. Nothing contained in the stipulation of the 
parties altered the time for filing the Memorandum of Costs. Lighty's Memorandum of Cost was 
not timely filed. 
C. The trial court abused its discretion 
1. Applicable facts 
On May 25, 2010, the trial court signed the order submitted by the Plaintiff in 
conjunction with their I.R.C.P. 4l(a)(2) motion, dismissing the case, and scheduled a hearing on 
the issue of attorney fees. R. Vol. I. pp 206-207. On June 16, 2010, the Defendants filed a 
Motion to Modify Order, or In the Alternative, to Enlarge Time. R. Vol. I pp. 208-210. Lighty 
cited to issues regarding their receipt of the order dismissing the case as the excuse for not timely 
filing their Memorandum of Costs. Lighty asserted their memorandum was due fourteen days 
from the date of the trial court's order, and since they had no knowledge of the order, there was 
excusable neglect for not timely filing the memorandum. 
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The trial court granted Lighty's motion to enlarge time to file their Memorandum of Cost. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 11. 11. 22-25, p. 12, 11. 1-4) and set a date for Lighty's submission of a 
memorandum of costs (Tr Vol. I, p. 12, 11. 14-18). The district court reasoned: " .. .I don't think 
the failure to timely file the request here, the memorandum, would be jurisdictional and, in fact, I 
think the Court clearly has the authority [to] make a determination as to whether it would be in 
the best interest of justice to allow additional time to properly submit this to the Court .... " Tr 
Vol. I., p. 11, 11. 24-25, p. 12, 11. 1-4. 
2. Lighty did not establish excusable neglect for the untimely filing 
The Defendants' essential arguments advanced before both the district court and this 
Court that there was neglect which excused the untimely filing can be summarized as: 
a. The Defendants did not receive the district court's dismissal order entered 
May 25, 2010, until June 11, 2010, and the time to file a memorandum of costs did not begin to 
accrue until that date; 
b. In fairness, Mesenbrink should be held to the terms of the stipulation 
signed by Mesenbrink' s attorney on May 17, 2010 which Lighty claims allowed for an untimely 
filing for costs and fees; and 
c. Mesenbrink is not prejudiced by the trial court's extension of time to 
permit Lighty further opportunity to submit a memorandum of costs. 
As set forth previously in this brief, the actual date of the Defendants' receipt of the trial 
court's dismissal order is irrelevant in this case. Final judgment was effectuated in the present 
case on May 17, 2010 when the parties' filed a stipulation for dismissal of the case. The time to 
file a memorandum of costs began to run on May 1 ih, not on June 11 th. No action was required 
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by the court to effectuate the final judgment. Thus, any error by the trial court did not prejudice 
Lighty's ability to timely file their memorandum of costs. 
Defendants attempt to distinguish their case from Straub by claiming that an order was 
required in the present case because the stipulation included a provision that the case be 
dismissed "with prejudice." However, I.R.C.P. 41(a)(l)(ii) specifically notes that the dismissal 
is "without prejudice" unless otherwise stated in the stipulation. Thus, Defendants argument that 
an order was necessary to dismiss the case with prejudice is without merit. The stipulation 
merely needed to include this term. 
Regarding the terms of the stipulation, the express term upon which the parties agreed 
was that the parties could submit the issue of costs and fees to the trial court for determination 
pursuant to the requirements of LR. C.P. 54( d)( 5) et seq. A prerequisite to a determination of a 
party's potential right to an award of attorney fees and costs is a timely filing of a memorandum 
of costs with the court. LR. C.P. 54(d)(5). The parties required application of this civil rule of 
procedure in the stipulation they signed, which was drafted by Lighty. Mesenbrink did nothing 
to interfere with Lighty's ability to timely file a memorandum of cost. Lighty simply failed to 
file their memorandum of costs within the fourteen day period required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). 
Based upon Lighty's briefing, the failure was due to their belief that the time for filing 
commenced upon entry of an order by the trial court dismissing the case. Thus, the failure was 
due to a misperception by Lighty of the adjudicatory effect of a Rule 4l(a)(l) stipulation to 
dismiss, and not due to any action by Mesenbrink. Mesenbrink has not failed to abide by the 
stipulation they signed. Rather, Lighty failed to abide by it by failing to file a timely 
memorandum of costs in accordance with I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). 
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Contrary to Lighty's contention, Mesenbrink did not mislead Lighty in any manner. The 
Defendants point to no verbal or written communication between the attorneys for the parties 
wherein Mesenbrink expressly or impliedly agreed that Lighty was entitled to an award of costs 
and fees, or that such request could be filed in an untimely manner. The question of whether 
either party was entitled to such an award from the trial court was undecided at the time the 
stipulation was executed. Further, it was agreed that Rule 54 would control submission of that 
issue to the Court. 
Finally, the Defendants assert that Mesenbrink is not prejudiced by the trial court's grant 
of an extension of time to Lighty, and, further, that the equities weigh in Lighty's favor. Lighty 
did not timely submit a request for attorney fees, and therefore waived that right. Mesenbrink is 
prejudiced if Lighty is granted an extension of time to comply with the rule due to their 
misperception of the law. 
It is disingenuous for Lighty to impliedly cast blame on Mesenbrink for Lighty' s failure 
to timely file a memorandum of costs. Lighty erred by failing to appreciate the legal import of 
filing a stipulation of dismissal. It is hard to imagine that the prejudices and equities lean in 
Lighty' s direction given that the mistake of law was theirs alone. 
3. The trial court abused its discretion by granting Lighty's request for 
additional time to submit their memorandum of costs. 
Mesenbrink recognizes that I.R.C.P. 6 (b)(2) grants the trial court authority to enlarge 
time" ... upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done 
where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. ... " Further, Mesenbrink 
acknowledges that:" ... [c]onsistent with the express terms of I.R.C.P. 6(b), this Court reviews a 
trial court's decision whether to grant a motion for enlargement on the abuse of discretion 
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standard. Wheeler v. McIntyre, 100 Idaho 286,289, 596 P.2d 798, 801 (1979). In re SRBA, 149 
Idaho 532, 538-39, 237 P.3d 1, 7-8 (2010). 
The test for whether a trial court abuses its discretion is (1) whether the trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable 
to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision 
by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 
Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600, 768 
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
In re SRBA, 149 Idaho 532,537,237 P.3d 1, 6 (2010). 
The trial court here concluded that the time to file a memorandum of costs commenced 
with the court's issuance of the order of dismissal. The court accepted Lighty's argument that 
they did not receive the order served by facsimile by the court clerk on May 24, 2010. R Vol. I, 
p. 207. The trial court granted Lighty's request for an enlargement of time on the basis that 
Lighty's failure to timely file the memorandum was therefore due to "excusable neglect." The 
proper analysis should have utilized the correct application of I.R.C.P 41 (a)(l), and the correct 
application of the holding in Straub. 
The question of compliance with the rules of procedure and evidence is one of law. See 
Harney v. Weatherby, 116 Idaho 904, 906-07, 781 P.2d 241, 243-44 (Ct.App. 1989). This Court 
freely reviews conclusions oflaw. Kootenai Elec. Co-op. Inc. v. Washington Water Power Co., 
127 Idaho 432,434, 901 P.2d 1333, 1335 (1995); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 
130 Idaho 736, 740, 947 P.2d 409,413 (1997); In re SRBA, 149 Idaho 532,537,237 P.3d 1, 6 
(2010). 
This Court in Straub reversed the district court's decision on the basis that the district 
court misapplied the rules of civil procedure and, hence, the trial court abused its discretion by 
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rendering a decision that was not "consistent with the [applicable] legal standards .... " Straub, 
145 Idaho at 71. 
The same is true here. Final judgment was entered upon the parties' filing of a 
stipulation for dismissal on May 17, 2010 rather than upon the trial court's issuance of an order 
of dismissal, or even the Lighty's receipt of the second service of that order of dismissal. The 
trial court abused its discretion by granting an extension of time to file the memorandum because 
the trial court's decision applied the incorrect legal standard and, thus, was not reached by an 
exercise of reason. It was inconsistent with applicable legal standards. 
Further, this Court has held that conduct constituting "excusable neglect" must be that 
which would be expected of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. Berg v. 
Kendall, 147 Idaho 571,212 P.3d 1001 (2009) (citing Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 
120, 123 (2005). I.R.C.P. 4l(a)(l)(ii) plainly states that a case is dismissed" ... by filing a 
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action." Straub offered 
guidance for the application of this procedural rule. Straub is not an obscure and archaic case. 
It was decided in 2007, while the underlying case in this matter was being pursued. A person in 
circumstance such as the ones Lighty found themselves should have been aware of the 
procedural ramifications of a 41(a)(2) dismissal. 
Lighty's failure to timely file a request for fees was not due to excusable neglect. Rather, 
it was due to a failure to recognize under I.R.C.P. 42(a)(2) that a stipulation to dismiss is the 
functional equivalent of a final judgment. Lighty' s were waiting for entry of a final judgment 
upon which to determine their deadline for filing. Thus, their actions were not based upon 
excusable neglect. Rather, they were based upon a misconception of the applicable rules and 
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case law. The trial court's determination that this error of law was excusable neglect was an 
abuse of discretion because it was inconsistent with applicable legal standards. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Lighty waived their right to file for attorney fees by failing to timely file a memorandum 
of cost. The failure was due to Lighty's error oflaw. Thus, Lighty is barred from applying for 
attorney fees. The trial comi abused its discretion by granting of an extension of time to Lighty 
to file their memorandum of cost because their failure to file was not due to excusable neglect, 
but rather stemmed from an error oflaw. The trial court's decision was inconsistent with 
applicable legal standards. The trial court's decision should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of September, 2013. 
SUSANP. WEEKS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
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